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IN THE SUPID.NE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-------------------------------------UTAH FARM PRODUCTION
CREDIT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 7588

vs.
COX, JEFFREY J. AND ELLIOTT J.

a co-partnership, ELLIOTT J.
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COX, BLANCHE COX, UNITED STATES

OF AMERICAN, ~CY-COLLINS BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, BANK OF
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Defendant-Respondents.

-------------------------------------BREIF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

THE PE'l'ITION FOR REHEARING IS UNTIMELY
Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
petition for rehearing must be within 20 days after the filing of the
decision.

The decision was filed March 9, 1981.

The petition for rehearing

was filed March 30, 1981. Even if the day of March 9th is not counted in
computing the 20 days, the 29th of March was the last day for the petition
for rehearing.

Therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction.
THE POINTS RAISED IN THE PErITION HAVE BEEN
FULLY CONSIDERED PREVIOUSLY

As is stated in the Appellant Advocacy Handbook of the Utah Supreme
~'

a petition for rehearing will not be granted where the points raised

in the petition have been fully considered in the original hearing.

People
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Ducherau v. House, 11P.618 (Utah 1886); Jones v. House. 11P.619 (Utah 1896).
The issue of mitigation and the agrument now being made by the
petitioner was ful1y considered in the original hearing and should not be
considered again.
THERE WAS NO MITIGATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW
Where there has been a breach of a loan commitment, the borrower must
make a reasonable attempt to obtain the money elsewhere. Cox Corporation v.
Dugger, 583 P.2d 96 (Utah 1978), 36 A.L.R. 1416; 22 Am Jur 2d §69 Damages;
Restatement, Contracts §343 (1932); 5 A. Corbin, Contracts §1078, at 446
(1964); Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co. of Houston.
App. 1976).

535 SW2d 740 (Tex. Civ.

Special damages, such as lost profits, are only recoverable where

the borrower is unable to obtain the money elsewhere.

Cox Corporation v.

Dugger, supra.
There is good reason why the mitigation must take the form of an
attempt to obtain an alternate source of financing.

That is because the

alternate loan eliminates all special damages, such as lost profits, and
reduces the damages to the difference in interest rates.

Ordinarily there is

no difference in interest rates and therefore damages cannot be more than
nominal because the money may usually be procured elsewhere at the same rate.
36 A.L.R. 1409; 22 Am Jur 2d §69, Damages; Bank of New Mexico v. Rice, 429 P.2d
368 (N.M. 1967); Investment Service Company v. Smither, 556 P.2d 955 (Ore.
1967); Consolidated American Life Ins. Co. v. Covington, 297 So. 2d 894 (Miss.
1974).
The Petitioner would have the Court approve of an alternate form of
mitigation which would have only reduced the damages by approximately $4,000.00
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(20,COO poults sold at 20¢. each) compared to the $44,000 that could have been
saved through alternate financing (assuming that any profit would have been
ma.de).

Furthermore, the sale of the 20 ,COO turkeys was not done for the

benefit of Utah Farm Production Credit Association (hereafter PCA), but solely
for the benefit of the petitioner. PCA was not even credited with the money
recieved by the petitioner from the sale.

So the sale was not any form of

mitigation. The only reasonable attempt at mitigation would have been to obtain
alternate financing even if there was a risk that the turkeys could die in the
meantime. It is unlikJy the turkeys would have died because the petitioner had
received a short term loan from the Bank of Ephriam to solve a similar problem
and certainly that could have been done again.

At least the petitioner is

required to have made an attempt.
The petitioner would have the Court believe that canceling the order
for 40,000 turkeys was an extraordinary effort by the petitioner to mitigate
damages.

Such is not the case.

It is not even reasonably certain that

petitioner would have been able to purchase the last 40, OCO poults.

Whether

the order for 40,CXJO poults would have been accepted would have been at the
option of the Board of Directors of the selling company.

(Transcript 176-177)

The manager of the selling company testified that petitioner would have been a
second priority customer on its order because they were not paying cash.
The argument that the petitioner had no collateral to offer as
security to another lender is without merit because the loan could have been
one that refinanced the delinquent loan with PCA thereby making the.collateral
available.

Such had been done in the pa.st.

(Transcript 137)

This would have
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-4given the petitioner a place to grow the turkeys because there would have
been no foreclosure. So it is not a situation where PCA is taking
advantage of a situation it created.

Rather it is a situation where the

petitioner has created his own problems by getting delinquent on the prior
loan and in a position where there could be a foreclosure.
There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
the petitioner gave up the opportunity to sell his farm and dividends at a
beneficial price.

The answers to interrogatories stated that there was no

buyer that was obligated to make any purchase.
The borrowers had plenty of time to obtain alternate financing.
Even if that had failed, all the borrowers had to do to get the loan from PCA
was pledge the stock of Elliott Cox, one of the respondents, in the Moroni
Coal Company.

(Transcript 102-103)

That would have created no burden

because Elliott Cox was already personally liable on the note and thus his
stock was already indirectly pledged.

(Transcript 288)

Consequently, it

would have been reasonable for the borrowers to have pledged the stock.
Having failed to do so and more particularly having failed to obtain
alternate financing, the damages must be denied as a matter of law.
The entire argument of the petitioner ignores one other important
factor.

Rather than get another loan, petitioner went to work with the

Moroni Coal Company.

That resulted in profits to that Company and he was a

46-47% shareholder. The profits were reinvested in the Company. The
appellant was not

credite~

with petitioner's salary.

with that benefit to the petitioner, but only
Even if PCA was given credit for the profit

and even if it was not enough to cover all the petitioner's alleged damages,
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petitioner would still not get the difference in damages because the
mititation must, as a matter of law, be in the form of an attempt to get
another loan before special damages are recoverable.

Furthermore, for all we

know, the profit to Moroni Coal Company was more than the damages claimed by
the petitioner for the alleged breach of loan agreement.
139-142)

(Transcript

Petitioner wants the profits from two busineses for the same year

when he could not have been two places at once.

THERE ARE OTHER REASONS WHY THE DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REVERSED

Even if the Court were to rehear the argument regarding
mitigation, the case should still_ have been reversed because:
1.

The loan officer who allegedly authorized the loan had no

2.

The damages for lost profit were not within the contemplation

authority.

·of the parties at the time of the contract as required by law.

3. The alleged loan agreement was not in writing as required by the
Statute of Frauds.

4. The petitioner failed to prove that he was an average turkey
grower or that he ran his business in a way that was comparable to the other
growers or that his facility was in any way comparable.
a crucial missing link in the chain of evidence.

Therefore, there is

In other words, there is no

connection between the fact that other growers earned a certain profit and
that therefore the petitioner would have earned such profit.

5. There was no prior history of successful operation. Again, as
a matter of law, this makes the damage award too speculative.
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In addition to the above reasons for total reversal, there are
other reasons why the trial court erro~ed as follows:
1.

Since it is not reasonably certain that the petitioner could

have taken delivery of the last 40,(XX) poults, two-thirds (2/3) of the
counterclaim award is speculative.
2.

Since it is speculative as to whether the dividend will be

available in 1982, the sum of $28,940.40, representing the dividend portion
of the counterclaim award, is speculative.

3. Since not all of the expenses were deducted from the claimed
profits, the amount of the counterclaim is incorrect and this would require
its dismissal entirely because the petitioner has failed to meet his burden
of proof.
4.

The award must be reduced $4, 000. 00 because pre judgment

interest is improper because it cannot be awarded on a unliquidated amount
and beca:use there was no evidence to support the amount calculated by the
trial court.
CONCLUSION
The Court has no juridiction over this case because the petition
for rehearing was untimely.

Even if there is jurisdiction there is nothing

new in the petition for rehearing and therefore the matter cannot be
reconsidered.
For good reason the law requires mitigation to be in the form of an
attempt to obtain alternate financing.
eliminate all damages.

This is because that will ordinarily

The claimed mitigation of the petitioner would only

have eliminated a fraction of the claimed damages and was not even done for
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the benefit of PCA.

The petitioner wants the money from the sale of the

turkeys and the benefits to the Moroni Coal Company without crediting PCA
with anything.

That is what they call mitigation.

There are many other good reasons why the lower court ruling should
be reversed.

Even if the mitigation argument of the petitioner had any

merit, it would not change the result of the case.
Respectf11l l.y Submitted

0Q_~L t3.,3c.J~

David B. Boyce

)

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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